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Memory loss in retrograde amnesia has long been held to be larger for recent periods than for remote
periods, a pattern usually referred to as the Ribot gradient. One explanation for this gradient is
consolidation of long-term memories. Several computational models of such a process have shown how
consolidation can explain characteristics of amnesia, but they have not elucidated how consolidation must
be envisaged. Here findings are reviewed that shed light on how consolidation may be implemented in
the brain. Moreover, consolidation is contrasted with alternative theories of the Ribot gradient. Consol-
idation theory, multiple trace theory, and semantization can all handle some findings well but not others.
Conclusive evidence for or against consolidation thus remains to be found.
Consolidation, as a concept, has a century-old history (Lechner,
Squire, & Byrne, 1999). It was originally proposed as an expla-
nation for retroactive interference (Muller & Pilzecker, 1900).
Although interference theory soon came to rely on other constructs
(McGeoch, 1932), consolidation fanned out to explain a plethora
of other phenomena. A search in PsycLIT in August 2003 focusing
on consolidation and memory, for example, produced 1,167 hits,
of which more than a quarter were from the period since 2000.
Consolidation is perhaps most often suggested as an explanation
for the gradient in retrograde amnesia (Alvarez & Squire, 1994;
McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Murre, 1996). After
damage to the hippocampal memory system, patients tend to lose
more of their recent than of their remote memories (Kim &
Fanselow, 1992; Kopelman, 1989; Squire, 1992). This pattern is
referred to here as the Ribot gradient after Theodule Ribot, who
first suggested that recent memories might be more vulnerable to
brain damage than remote memories (Ribot, 1881). The Ribot
gradient can be explained by assuming that memories are first
dependent on a hippocampal memory system for their retrieval.
Through consolidation, memories gradually become stored in the
neocortex, making them independent of the hippocampal system
(Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Squire, Cohen, & Nadel, 1984). If the
hippocampal system is damaged, recent memories are lost, be-
cause they still depend on that system. Old memories have already
been stored in the neocortex through consolidation and are thus
spared.
Although most consolidation theorists agree on the outlines of
the process, many details remain vague. The precise time course of
consolidation is unclear, and when it takes place and how it occurs
remain speculative. Partly for this reason, but mainly as a result of
a thorough and intelligent critique by Nadel, Moscovitch, and
colleagues (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Nadel, Samsonovitch,
Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000), consolidation theory has become
controversial in the past few years. Here we review what is known
about consolidation and the arguments that have been forwarded
for its existence. In addition, we discuss two alternative explana-
tions for the Ribot gradient and compare these explanations with
consolidation theory.
What Is Long-Term Consolidation?
Long-term memory consolidation is not the only process for
which the term is used. The different phenomena that have been
labeled consolidation in the literature occur at widely varying time
scales (Squire & Alvarez, 1995). Consolidation on the shortest
time scales refers to a biochemical process of “fixing.” It is
invoked in the amnesia literature to explain the short, dense ret-
rograde amnesia that often occurs after blunt head injury (Kapur,
1999; Lynch & Yarnell, 1973; Whitty & Zangwill, 1977). This
immediate preonset amnesia (or “pre-ictal amnesia”; Kapur, 1999)
can be dissociated from the diffuse or patchier retrograde amnesia
that can also result from trauma and that may extend over much
longer periods of time (Kapur, 1999; Williams & Zangwill, 1952).
The most likely explanation for immediate preonset amnesia in-
volves a short-term fixing mechanism that operates in the minute
range, with which the concussion interferes (McGaugh, 2000).
On a somewhat longer time scale, there is evidence for a process
of reorganization that takes several hours and is sometimes re-
ferred to as consolidation. Karni and Sagi (1993) found that after
people learn a visual skill, their performance improves substan-
tially after a delay of 8 hr or more. They referred to the process
underlying this improvement as consolidation. Similar processes,
on a scale of hours and also referred to as consolidation, seem to
occur in motor learning (Shadmehr & Holcomb, 1997). In the
animal literature (e.g., Tiunova, Anokhin, & Rose, 1998), the term
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may refer to a process of biochemical reorganization in the syn-
apse that occurs in the hours following learning and with which
inhibitors of protein synthesis may interfere. Such a phase can last
a few hours; memory for place avoidance can, for example, be
blocked by infusions of the hippocampus with protein synthesis
blockers for up to 6 hr after learning (Muller Igaz, Vianna, Medina,
& Izquierdo, 2002). This process of protein synthesis has been
termed cellular consolidation (Dudai & Morris, 2000).
Cellular consolidation or processes operating at even shorter
time scales are not the consolidation that is invoked to explain the
Ribot gradient. Because these gradients stretch over months and
years, underlying memory consolidation must also take months or
years (see Figure 1). This hypothetical process transforms a mem-
ory from being dependent on the hippocampus to being indepen-
dent of that structure (Marr, 1971; Squire, 1992; Squire et al.,
1984). Although it is tempting to speak of a transfer of memories
from one store to another, this is not what most theorists have in
mind when they think of consolidation, and it would also not be in
agreement with the facts (e.g., Izquierdo et al., 1997). Memories
are usually envisaged as stored in the neocortex, but at first
“bound” together by the hippocampus. Consolidation, then, is the
strengthening of connections within the neocortex to the extent
that these connections suffice for retrieval (Milner, 1989; Paller,
1997; Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Teyler & DiScenna, 1986; Witten-
berg & Tsien, 2002), as can be seen in Figure 2. This is also how
extant models of memory consolidation have implemented the
process (Alvarez & Squire, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; Meeter,
2003; Meeter & Murre, 2004, in press; Murre, 1996).
Consolidation in Connectionist Models
The three models that have simulated corticohippocampal inter-
actions (Alvarez & Squire, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; Murre,
1996) shed some light on these processes, even though they do not
elucidate the details of the mechanisms underlying consolidation.
The basic assumption they share is that there is a fast-learning
hippocampal memory system, and a neocortical memory system in
which representations are gradually built up during consolidation.
This is implemented as a process of rehearsal, in which stored
patterns are strengthened or repaired by rehearsing with patterns
themselves (McClelland et al., 1995; Robins, 1995), or as “pseu-
dorehearsal,” in which patterns are generated from the network by
means of random cues (Alvarez & Squire, 1994; Meeter & Murre,
in press; Murre, 1996; Robins, 1996). These patterns are then
interleaved with new patterns to protect, repair, or strengthen old
ones. In TraceLink, for example (Meeter & Murre, 2004, in press;
Murre, 1996), the neocortical memory system is a large layer in
which only weak connections are laid between nodes belonging to
one pattern. Consolidation is simulated by allowing the model,
from an initial random state, to relax into an attractor (i.e., retriev-
ing an existing memory) and then updating the weights with a
Hebbian learning rule. Eventually, the connections between neo-
cortical nodes built up during consolidation allow the patterns to
be retrieved without the support of the hippocampal system.
Consolidation is thus modeled as the strengthening of connec-
tions within a neocortical pattern that is retrieved through the
hippocampal system. This implies that there must be consolidation
phases in which the hippocampal system reinstates patterns in
neocortical memory areas. Furthermore, such a consolidation
phase may lead to higher retrievability of the pattern, because
consolidation in the TraceLink model is equivalent to additional
learning. Experimental techniques should thus be able to detect
small effects of improved performance on memory tasks after
consolidation (this would not have to be the case if consolidation
were a pure reorganization process).
A more detailed analysis of the models leads to other con-
straints. For example, consolidation is sensitive to “runaway con-
solidation,” a vicious circle in which one pattern becomes stronger
through consolidation, becomes more likely to be consolidated in
Figure 1. Life cycle of a human memory acquired at time  0 on a pseudologarithmic scale. Darkness of tone
indicates involvement of a memory system in retrieval. Memories are first held in short-term memory/working
memory (STM), which is generally thought to rely on a network centered on the frontal lobes. If the memory
has to be retrieved at this stage, this will be done through STM. Within minutes, memories are stored in
long-term memory (hippocampus and neocortex) through a process of fixing. In subsequent hours, a process of
cellular consolidation stabilizes the memory. Long-term memory consolidation is thought to start thereafter, and
it involves a strengthening of the memory in the neocortex. Accompanying this is a weakening of memories in
the hippocampus. Whereas retrieval will involve both the hippocampus and the neocortex in the intermediate
term (days to years), it may come to depend solely on the neocortex after consolidation.
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the next trial, and ends up monopolizing all consolidation re-
sources while crowding out other memories (Meeter, 2003). In the
models, runaway consolidation is avoided through the dominance
of the hippocampal system, helping to reactivate patterns in the
neocortex that have not yet benefited from consolidation (Alvarez
& Squire, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; Meeter & Murre, in
press; Murre, 1996). If, during the reactivation, learning occurs
within the hippocampal system, runaway consolidation immedi-
ately rears its head, in that now consolidated memories become
stronger in both the hippocampus and the neocortex (Meeter &
Murre, in press). Consolidation should therefore take place during
a period in which the hippocampus is not very plastic.
Time Course of Consolidation
In simulations of consolidation, such as those with TraceLink,
the time scale on which consolidation processes take place is not
made explicit. In a sense, it remains a free parameter of the models.
This has been a point of criticism of consolidation theory (Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997); in no way does consolidation offer any con-
straints on how long the process might require. As discussed later,
alternative theories do not offer constraints on the time scale either.
Unfortunately, the only hint about the time course of the consol-
idation process is the length of the Ribot gradient. Because that
length can vary from days or weeks in rats (Izquierdo et al., 1997;
Kim & Fanselow, 1992; Winocur, McDonald, & Moscovitch,
2001) to months in monkeys (Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1990) and
years or decades in humans, consolidation may proceed faster in
some species than in others (see McClelland et al., 1995, for
estimates of speed of consolidation derived from model fitting).
However, even within species the length of the Ribot curve can
vary considerably (Murray & Bussey, 2001). In humans, for ex-
ample, the length of the Ribot gradient can vary from a few years
(Levin et al., 1985) to decades (Albert, Butters, & Levin, 1979;
Mayes, Daum, Markowitch, & Sauter, 1997). Larger hippocampal
system lesions may result in longer Ribot gradients (Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997), and length probably varies with age of the
patient, type of lesion, type of material, and other variables.
Empirical Ribot curves are mostly very noisy, and the length of the
Ribot gradient is usually only eyeballed. Fitting of curves with a
theoretically motivated mathematical model might improve clarity
and, through the fitted parameters, finally provide more systematic
estimates of the time course of consolidation and what it de-
pends on.
Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) attacked not only the variety of
durations of retrograde amnesia but also the length that they can
have. Ribot curves can span well over 25 years (Albert et al., 1979;
Figure 2. View of how consolidation contributes to memory, as incorporated in the TraceLink model (Meeter
& Murre, in press; Murre, 1996). TraceLink consists of three systems: neocortical memory repository (trace
system), a temporary medial–temporal lobe memory store (link system), and a system regulating the link
system’s plasticity (modulatory system, indicated by W for its control of learning rates). The normal formation
of episodic memories is, for expository purposes, subdivided into four stages. Stage 1: A new memory
representation activates a number of trace elements (shown as solid circles), symbolizing an episodic memory
widely dispersed over the neocortex. Stage 2: Several link elements are activated by the trace representation.
Also, the modulatory system has been activated, strengthening plasticity in the link system. Relevant trace–link
connections are therefore quickly strengthened (shown as thicker connections). Stage 3: Weak trace–trace
connections are developing through consolidation. The modulatory system is now not activated. Stage 4: Strong
trace–trace connections have been formed, which can now sustain memory retrieval. Trace–link connections
have decayed.
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Beatty, Salmon, Butters, Heindel, & Granholm, 1988; Squire,
Haist, & Shimamura, 1989). A consolidation process lasting 25
years would, according to Nadel and Moscovitch (1997), stretch
credulity, because for most of history humans did not live much
longer than that. A transfer process lasting two thirds of a lifetime
would not serve any purpose; for example, the idea that the
hippocampus has limited capacity would lose its force as a ground
for consolidation if, in fact, memories from a large part of our lives
were stored in it. In the models of consolidation, most memory
consolidation occurs in the first period after acquisition, but the
models indeed seem to consolidate memories for as long as the
simulation lasts (McClelland et al., 1995; Meeter & Murre, in
press). This suggests that although consolidation might not be as
intense after a decade as immediately after learning, if it is to
explain the Ribot gradient in the way exemplified by the models,
it must be a process lasting many years in humans.
Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Consolidation
As discussed earlier, consolidation has been implemented as the
gradual strengthening, within the neocortex, of patterns retrieved
with help of the hippocampus. This does not pin down how this
occurs in the brain. It might be that it happens only with conscious
rehearsal. Indeed, rehearsing a memory generally strengthens it,
and retrieval also has a biochemical impact in the brain (Debiec,
LeDoux, & Nader, 2002). However, if the external world provides
all cues for rehearsal, it would be difficult to explain Ribot gradi-
ents in animals for tasks performed away from the home cage, such
as the Morris water maze (Murray & Bussey, 2001; Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997; Squire, 1992). Because explicit rehearsal oc-
curs either in response to cues from the environment or through
reminiscence, we would thus be forced to grant conscious remi-
niscence to experimental animals such as rats and mice.
Another mechanism by which consolidation might operate is
subconscious activation of memories (Murre, 1997). One could
postulate that when a memory is retrieved, related memories
become temporarily activated. Although they stay below the
threshold of consciousness, this activation might lead to a strength-
ening of the cortical base of these related memories through
processes that may also underlie semantic priming (i.e., the facil-
itation of one word through previous presentation of an associate,
e.g., faster recognition of the word dog if the word cat has been
presented previously). In this way, memories that are not rehearsed
might be consolidated through rehearsal of associated memories.
However, it is unclear whether semantic priming has effects that
last longer than a few seconds (Zeelenberg & Pecher, 2002).
The most frequently proposed method of consolidation is re-
hearsal during sleep (Marr, 1971; McClelland et al., 1995; Robins
& McCallum, 1999; Squire & Alvarez, 1995). The idea of con-
solidation during sleep has a long history, and a large body of
circumstantial evidence has been amassed. For example, changes
in sleep patterns have been noted after strong learning experiences.
In one study, increases in REM sleep intensity were observed
among students after a period of examinations (Smith & Lapp,
1991). Similarly, when animals are required to learn new tasks or
are exposed to an enriched environment, they tend to spend more
time in REM sleep (Hennevin, Hars, Maho, & Bloch, 1995).
Subsequent sleep also is characterized by larger than usual bio-
chemical activity connected to plasticity (Smith, 1996).
Psychological experiments have shown improvements in declar-
ative memory after sleep (Ekstrand, 1967; Jenkins & Dallenbach,
1924; Van Ormer, 1932). Some studies have found slow-wave
sleep to be helpful for declarative memory (Fowler, Sullivan, &
Ekstrand, 1973; Philal & Born, 1997), whereas others have found
the effects to depend more on REM sleep (Smith, 1996). Striking
improvements after sleep have been noted in simple skills (Stick-
gold, James, & Hobson, 2000). Critics have questioned whether
REM sleep has a role in memory, however (Blagrove, 1991;
Siegel, 2001; Vertes & Eastman, 2000): Total elimination of REM
sleep, as produced by a widely used class of antidepressants—
monoamine oxidase inhibitors—does not notably affect memory
function in humans (Siegel, 2001). Other researchers have sug-
gested that this may be true only in the case of declarative memory
and that REM sleep is important for procedural learning (Stick-
gold, Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse, 2001).
Slow-wave sleep is perhaps the most viable candidate for the
phase in which consolidation of declarative memory occurs. Syn-
aptic transmission in the hippocampus tends to be more efficient
during slow-wave sleep (Squire & Alvarez, 1995), while at the
same time plasticity is reduced in the hippocampus (Hasselmo,
1999; Jones Leonard, McNaughton, & Barnes, 1987). As already
discussed, this is what models of consolidation would require for
the proposed consolidation process to occur during sleep. More-
over, several studies have shown that hippocampal neurons active
during daytime tasks are reactivated in slow-wave sleep (Nadasdy,
Hirase, Czurko, Csicsvari, & Buzsaki, 1999; Pavlides & Winson,
1989; Skaggs & McNaughton, 1996; Sutherland & McNaughton,
2000; Wilson & McNaughton, 1994). Wilson and McNaughton
(1994), for example, monitored hippocampal cell activity in rats
with multielectrode recordings. They showed that cells that had
been active concurrently during a period of spatial exploration
tended to become active in a correlated fashion again during a
subsequent episode of deep sleep. Memories thus seem to be
reactivated during sleep. Such “replay” activity has also been
found in REM sleep (Louie & Wilson, 2001; Poe, Nitz, McNaugh-
ton, & Barnes, 2000) and even in quiet waking (provided that
ripple activity is seen in the hippocampus; Kudrimonti, Barnes, &
McNaughton, 1999).
An indication that these hippocampal reactivations drive the
neocortex during slow-wave sleep has also been found. Qin, Mc-
Naughton, Skaggs, and Barnes (1997) recorded hippocampal and
neocortical cell activity with the same multielectrode devices used
by Wilson and McNaughton (1994). Analyzing correlations be-
tween cell firing, the authors showed slow-wave sleep replay of
daytime activities not only in the hippocampus but also in the
parietal lobe of the neocortex. Moreover, hippocampal and neo-
cortical cells that had been active together during waking were also
active together during sleep (Qin et al., 1997). The temporal order
in which such cell pairs fired was not preserved, unlike that
between cell pairs within the hippocampus or within the neocortex.
In line with consolidation theory, the authors explained this by
noting that during waking the neocortex may drive the hippocam-
pus, whereas during sleep this situation may be reversed.
There is also evidence for cortical reorganization in sleep. In
young cats, investigators covered one eye for 6 hr and observed
how visual cortex neurons responsive to this eye became respon-
sive to the other eye. The amount of change in firing properties in
the neurons was correlated with the amount of slow-wave sleep
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that the kittens received (Frank, Issa, & Stryker, 2001). Although
there is no indication that the hippocampus played a role in this
reorganization, the results show that changes in neocortical repre-
sentations may take place during sleep.
All conditions on consolidation set by current models such as
TraceLink thus seem to be fulfilled during slow-wave sleep. There
is evidence that during slow-wave sleep traces of recent experi-
ences are reactivated spontaneously in the hippocampus, that hip-
pocampal and neocortical memories are reactivated together, that
hippocampal plasticity is low, that neocortical representations can
be reorganized, and that memory may improve. Nevertheless, it is
not yet beyond doubt that the reactivations seen in slow-wave
sleep constitute consolidation processes (Sutherland & McNaugh-
ton, 2000). No learning has, for example, been shown to take place
during these reactivations. Moreover, reactivation has, until now,
been studied only in sleep episodes immediately following the
behavior that forms the criterion. In other words, findings do not
address whether consolidation lasts longer than a single day, which
would be expected from the length of the Ribot gradient even in
rodents (Squire, 1992). In summary, the contribution of conscious,
subconscious, and sleep-induced processes of rehearsal to consol-
idation is still an open question, though one with promising leads.
Evidence
In spite of its somewhat speculative status, the hypothesis that
memories are consolidated in the neocortex attracts a large and
continuing following. Its main attraction is the explanation it offers
for the Ribot gradient and other findings from neuropsychology.
This explanation is not very parsimonious, as a new process is
assumed to explain a single data pattern. In the past decade,
however, support from other sources than neuropsychology has
started to accumulate. We first discuss imaging studies and neu-
robiological findings that support consolidation theory and then
review the neuropsychological evidence.
Evidence From Functional Imaging
If the hippocampal memory system plays a time-limited role in
memory, a central tenet of consolidation theory, then retrieval of
recent and remote memories should differentially tax the hip-
pocampus. This logic has led to at least six functional imaging
studies, five of which involved human participants and one of
which involved experimental animals.
Of the studies with humans, two yielded data consistent with
consolidation theory, and two did not. The latter two studies
compared brain activity during retrieval of recent memories with
that during retrieval of remote autobiographical memories using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Both studies
showed that hippocampal activation during retrieval was unaf-
fected by age of the memory (Maguire, Henson, Mummery, &
Frith, 2001; Ryan et al., 2001), and one produced the same result
for questions about the news (Maguire et al., 2001). A third study
also compared memory for recent and remote public knowledge
with fMRI but did reveal evidence for a time-limited role of the
hippocampus (Haist, Bowden Gore, & Mao, 2001). In this study,
people were shown faces of people of recent fame (i.e., who were
famous in the 1980s and 1990s) and faces of people who had been
famous in earlier decades (1940s to 1970s). There was a small
increase in right hippocampal complex activity with recent famous
faces relative to the remote famous faces. The fourth study, also
using fMRI, investigated retrieval of memories for topographic
locations (Niki & Luo, 2002). Places visited in the past 1.5 years
were compared with places visited at least 7 years in the past.
Recall of the more recent visits was associated with larger medial–
temporal lobe activation relative to the more remote visits, “peak-
ing in the left parahippocampal gyrus” (Niki & Lou, 2002, p. 501).
The fifth study, the only one to use positron emission tomography,
failed to reveal differential hippocampal activation in any retrieval
condition and therefore is not informative as to whether the hip-
pocampus is more involved in recent or remote memory retrieval
(Conway et al., 1999).
All of the studies discussed involved drawbacks that make
conclusions difficult. For example, memories used in the study
were often elicited from the participants in a session a few weeks
(Maguire et al., 2001), days (Niki & Luo, 2002), or hours (Ryan et
al., 2001) before the scanning, which means that recall from this
session may have played a role, mitigating any age effect. More-
over, activation of the hippocampus during retrieval of remote
memories may partly reflect learning about the retrieved remote
memories (Niki & Luo, 2002; Ryan et al., 2001), and the task used
by Maguire et al. (2001) may have been too undemanding (Niki &
Luo, 2002).
Also, for other reasons it is not clear what to make of the
inconsistent results. Effects were small in the studies that did find
them, and a null finding can always be a matter of lack of power
(indeed, with the public events questions used by Maguire et al.,
2001, a small trend toward greater activation of the hippocampus
with recent memories was apparent). Moreover, there were many
task differences that may explain the differences in results (e.g., it
is striking that the studies finding differential hippocampal activa-
tion used visual stimuli and descriptions of places, whereas the
other two relied on verbal questions).
There is also a conceptual problem with the studies. The logic of
the experiments assumes that if the hippocampus is active during
the retrieval of remote memories, it must underlie that retrieval.
However, the hippocampus is also massively active during simple
classical eyeblink conditioning (e.g., Berger & Thompson, 1978),
although the eyeblink conditioned response is actually acquired
faster after hippocampal lesions (Schmaltz & Theios, 1972). Thus,
hippocampal activity during retrieval of remote memories might,
as in the case of classical conditioning, reflect processing that is
essentially superfluous in terms of performance. A finding of
similar hippocampal activity in the retrieval of remote and recent
memories is therefore not a falsification of consolidation theory. A
finding of more activity in the retrieval of recent than of remote
memories is informative, because it is consistent with consolida-
tion theory and not a trivial result.
Perhaps the strongest study showing such a pattern was the
sixth, involving animals (Bontempi, Laurent-Demir, Destrade, &
Jaffard, 1999). Mice were trained on a radial arm maze discrimi-
nation problem, with a recall test occurring either 5 or 25 days after
most recent training. Brain activity was measured after recall by
means of a radioactive tracer. After the short interval, hippocampal
activity was predominant, whereas after the long interval, no
hippocampal activity was found (as compared with quiet controls).
Instead, the temporal frontal and anterior cingulate neocortex were
activated. These results are in line with what would be expected
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from consolidation theory. Ryan et al. (2001) offered as an alter-
native explanation for the results that retention interval was con-
founded with performance, and worse performance for the remote
memories may thus have caused the lower hippocampal activation.
However, this explanation ignores the recruitment of neocortical
areas in recall after the long interval, along with the fact that
performance was strongly correlated (.69, p .05) with hippocam-
pal activation after the short interval but not at all after the long
interval (instead, it correlated with frontal cortex and nucleus
accumbens activation). At the least, the results thus support that
there is a switch from hippocampus-based retrieval to cortex-based
retrieval.
Evidence From Neurobiology
A temporary role of the hippocampus in memory, as indicated
by the Ribot gradient and the Bontempi et al. (1999) findings, has
also gained support from several neuropharmacological studies. In
one such study, rats were trained to locate a hidden platform in a
water maze (Atlantis platform) and then tested 16 days later
(Riedel et al., 1999). Hippocampal activation was blocked after
training with an AMPA receptor antagonist (LY326325). This was
done either in the first 7 days after training or from the fifth to the
seventh day after training. At test, 16 days after acquisition, control
rats spent a significant amount of time swimming in the quadrant
in which the platform had been located (but from which it was
removed for the test). Rats whose hippocampal activity was
blocked, however, swam at random independent of when the
AMPA antagonist was administered. This was not due to residual
effects of LY326325, in that the animals readily learned, on the
same day as the test, the location of a platform in a new water
maze. Consolidation theory can explain these findings by assum-
ing that the temporary deactivation of the hippocampus blocked
memory consolidation, leading to a loss of task-relevant memories.
In another study, rats were trained in a step-down inhibitory
avoidance task (Izquierdo et al., 1997). The animals were tested
after a retention interval of 1 day, 30 days, or 60 days. Before the
test, an AMPA receptor blocker (CNQX) was injected in one of
three regions: the hippocampus and amygdala, the entorhinal cor-
tex, or the parietal lobe of the neocortex. When a 1-day interval
was used, injections of CNQX in any of the three regions could
block performance. After 30 days, only injections in the entorhinal
and parietal cortices affected performance; the hippocampus and
amygdala had ceased to be of critical value. After a retention
interval of 60 days, only injections in the parietal cortex still had
an effect on performance. These data seem in line with consoli-
dation theory, in that memories are stored at acquisition in the
neocortex (here the parietal cortex) and the hippocampal system.
Directly after learning, the hippocampal system representation is
needed for retrieval, but 2 months after learning the representation
in the neocortex can sustain retrieval on its own.
Other evidence comes from a study (Frankland, O’Brien, Ohno,
Kirkwood, & Silva, 2001) in which wild-type mice were compared
with mice that had a mutation resulting in severely impaired
long-term potentiation (LTP) in the neocortex (hippocampal LTP
remained intact). The mice with impaired neocortical LTP were
able to acquire new memories to the same degree as wild-type
mice, as assessed by several tasks, but forgot them at a much
higher speed than the normal mice. Consolidation theory can
explain these data as follows: Although memories can be acquired
via the hippocampus, they are forgotten more rapidly because of
inadequate consolidation in the neocortex.
The three studies just described all seem to deliver strong
support for consolidation theory. In the case of two of these
studies, however, alternative explanations are possible. In the
Riedel et al. (1999) study, 5 days of deactivation may have led to
the loss of all memories from the hippocampus, independent of age
and independent of consolidation. In the Frankland et al. (2001)
study, it may have been that both the hippocampus and the neo-
cortex store memories in a way sufficient for retrieval in wild-type
mice. If hippocampal memories are forgotten relatively swiftly (an
assumption of consolidation theory), then animals relying on only
the hippocampus would show faster forgetting than animals rely-
ing on both the hippocampus and neocortex. In other words, the
Frankland et al. study does not allow us to decide between a
consolidation account (from hippocampus-based to cortex-based
retrieval) and a dual storage account (both hippocampus and
cortex). For the Izquierdo et al. (1997) study, that second account
is not possible, however, because it does not explain why at shorter
intervals a lesion of the hippocampus or entorhinal cortex disrupts
performance. Of the mentioned studies, this one thus offers the
strongest support for consolidation theory.
One other pertinent study is at best only consistent with con-
solidation. In a design similar to that of Riedel et al. (1999),
Shimizu, Tang, Rampon, and Tsien (2000) trained mice on a
Morris water maze and then blocked N-methyl-D-aspartate
(NMDA) receptors in field CA1 of the hippocampus in the first 4
days after training. This led to a small loss in performance 12 days
later. Performance was not affected by NMDA blockers delivered
in the 3 days before the test, starting 12 days after training.
Shimizu et al. (2000) viewed their data as evidence for consolida-
tion occurring within the hippocampus, instead of between the
hippocampus and the neocortex. Consolidation theory as it has
been modeled is not consistent with plasticity in the hippocampus
during consolidation, which suggests that the findings are at odds
with consolidation theory. However, NMDA receptors play an
important role not only in plasticity but also in transmission of
signals (Phillips & Silverstein, 2003). It is thus possible that the
results of Shimizu et al. (2000) do not reflect the effects of
blocking plasticity, but of hindering transmission in the hippocam-
pus during memory consolidation. This would make the results
consistent with consolidation theory.
Evidence From Neuropsychology
The strongest argument for long-term memory consolidation
remains the existence of the Ribot gradient. Although other expla-
nations are possible, the consolidation hypothesis provides a sim-
ple and compelling reason for the gradient. Skeptics of consolida-
tion have, for that reason, often been skeptical of the gradient as
well. Nadel and Moscovitch (1997), for example, claimed that
ungraded memory loss is just as frequent as graded memory loss,
and they listed a number of studies in which patients with damage
limited to the hippocampal region exhibited either flat retrograde
amnesia or amnesia with a very shallow gradient. In one recent
study, a patient with lesions restricted to the hippocampus showed
a flat loss of memories in episodic retrieval tests, although a
gradient was evident in personal semantic memory (Cipolotti et al.,
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2001). Such findings are problematic for consolidation theory and
can be explained only with an ad hoc assumption of undetected
neocortical malfunctioning (Squire & Alvarez, 1995), inadequate
sampling of memories, or a psychogenic component of the amne-
sia (in that psychogenic retrograde amnesia tends to be extensive
and ungraded; Kopelman, 1994).
Nevertheless, the gradient has been found many times in both
human and animal studies (Anagnostaras, Gale, & Fanselow,
2001; Brown, 2002; Kim & Fanselow, 1992; Kopelman, 1989;
Rempel-Clower, Zola, Squire, & Amaral, 1996; Squire, 1992), and
Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) also seemed of the opinion that
these studies warrant an explanation. Moreover, other characteris-
tics of amnesia are easily explained by consolidation theory. Ex-
amples are the intactness of many forms of implicit memory in
amnesia, the shrinking of transient retrograde amnesia, and the
high but not perfect correlation between anterograde and retro-
grade amnesia1 (Meeter & Murre, in press).
Patterns in the episodic memory of semantic dementia patients
are also easy to understand in the light of consolidation theory
(Graham, 1999; Meeter & Murre, 2004; Murre, Graham, &
Hodges, 2001). Patients with semantic dementia show atrophy of
the temporal neocortex, with, according to initial reports, a sparing
of the hippocampus. Remote memory in semantic dementia as-
sumes an “inverse gradient”: a loss of distant memories with
relative preservation of more recently experienced memories (Gra-
ham, Becker, & Hodges, 1997; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary,
1996). This characteristic of semantic dementia was predicted by
Murre (1996) from consolidation theory. It can be understood as
the result of a damaged neocortical store of remote memories, with
an intact hippocampal store of recent memories. The relative
intactness of episodic learning in semantic dementia also follows
naturally from this view.
In different ways, data from human retrograde amnesia and
semantic dementia and data from retrograde amnesia in experi-
mental animals are open to methodological critique. If gradients in
retrograde amnesia and semantic dementia are the result of a
methodological caveat, then the ground for supposing a consoli-
dation mechanism would fall away.
Neuropsychological data are often noisy as a result of small
sample sizes and considerable interpatient heterogeneity. Many
neuropsychological tests are also complex, tasking many skills at
once. Studies of retrograde amnesia are no exception. A thorough
test of consolidation theory is possible only among patients whose
lesions are, to a large extent, limited to the hippocampal complex.
Patients with such lesions among whom retrograde amnesia has
been assessed can be counted on perhaps three hands, and it is
never the case that the rest of the brain is normal (Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997; Reed & Squire, 1998; Rempel-Clower et al.,
1996).
Moreover, construction of tests of retrograde amnesia is fraught
with difficulties. Tests for retrograde amnesia come in many
formats, but for the analysis of gradients one characteristic is most
important: the variable on which items from different periods in
the test are equated. This variable can be either acquisition strength
or retrieval probability. In both cases “item difficulty” is equalized,
but at different points in time: either at acquisition or at recall. If
test items are equated in regard to mean acquisition strength,
memories are chosen in such a way that it is a priori plausible they
were learned with the same strength. Examples are a test in which
questions were asked about television series that had run just one
season (Squire & Slater, 1975) and a test in which questions about
news events were formulated according to a tight script from
newspaper headings (Leplow et al., 1997). In such cases, interpre-
tation of gradients is relatively straightforward. Test items can also
be equated on retrieval probability, by verifying that a norm
population has an equal score on all periods in the test (if assess-
ment of a Ribot gradient is an important goal, a slight forgetting
gradient is also acceptable). In this case, however, items from
different time periods must differ. Items from remote periods have
survived a long retention interval. When they nevertheless have a
retrieval probability equal to that of items from more recent
periods, these remote items must have had a higher acquisition
strength than recent items. This difference may be simply quanti-
tative, but it may also be qualitative. Remote items might, for
example, be more “semantic” and recent items more “episodic”
(definitions of these terms are provided later). Such differences
may then explain why the remote items in the test are less affected
by retrograde amnesia than the recent items (Cermak, 1984).
In fact, all studies that we are aware of with patients whose
lesions were putatively limited to the hippocampus involved tests
of the second kind, in which items were equated on retrieval
probability. There is thus a possibility that this feature of retro-
grade amnesia tests explains the Ribot curve. However, if some
qualitative difference makes recent items more difficult than re-
mote items, it becomes very puzzling why there are systematic
differences in gradients between different patient groups. Patients
with Korsakoff’s disease generally show steeper gradients than
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Kopelman, 1989), both Parkin-
son’s disease and Huntington’s disease tend to show flat gradients
in retrograde amnesia (Albert, Butters, & Brandt, 1981; Beatty et
al., 1988; Leplow et al., 1997), and patients with semantic demen-
tia show a reverse gradient (Graham & Hodges, 1997; Hodges &
Graham, 1998; Snowden et al., 1996). Such differences are puz-
zling if, for methodological reasons, one should expect a Ribot
gradient in all patients with remote memory impairment.
With regard to semantic dementia, some discussion has ensued
as to whether it genuinely offers support for consolidation theory
or not (Graham, Patterson, Pratt, & Hodges, 1999; Moscovitch &
Nadel, 1999). Moscovitch and Nadel (1999) have claimed that it
does not; in their view, remote memories are not affected any more
1 Consolidation theory predicts a correlation between impaired learning
(anterograde amnesia) and loss of recent memories (graded retrograde
amnesia), in that both depend on the intactness of the hippocampal memory
system. Empirically, the correlation tends to fall between .3 and .6 in
groups of patients with degenerative diseases or with mixed etiology
(Kopelman, 1989; Mayes et al., 1997; Schmidtke & Vollmer, 1997; Squire
et al., 1989). From the data reported by Russel and Nathan (1946), gamma
correlations of .77 and .68 can be computed for patients with concussions.
In all of these cases, lesion heterogeneity may lower the correlation relative
to its predicted value (e.g., the TraceLink model of consolidation explains
disproportionate anterograde amnesia as arising out of basal forebrain
damage; Meeter & Murre, in press). Series of patients with damage limited
to the hippocampus are too small to allow meaningful correlational anal-
yses. However, when one orders the 8 patients reported by Squire and
colleagues according to extent of retrograde amnesia, this ordering corre-
sponds perfectly with that of both the extent of anterograde amnesia and
the size of the lesion (Reed & Squire, 1998; Rempel-Clower et al., 1996).
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than recent memories in semantic dementia. Gradients reported in
the literature, with test performance being lower for remote periods
than for recent periods, could result from a greater difficulty of old
versus new test items. These differences are, they claim, masked in
the performance of normal controls by ceiling effects (Nadel et al.,
2000).
Although not on all tests of remote memory, controls perform
close to ceiling (e.g., incident items of the Autobiographical Mem-
ory Interview in Graham & Hodges, 1997), two other develop-
ments have seriously undermined the consolidation story of
semantic dementia. First, careful volumetric analysis has under-
mined the view that the hippocampi are spared in semantic de-
mentia; in fact, hippocampal damage may be as extensive as in
Alzheimer’s disease (Galton et al., 2001). Second, it has become
clear that episodic learning is not normal in patients with semantic
dementia, but extraordinarily sensory in nature. Although patients
can recognize pictures of objects shown earlier nearly as well as
normal controls can, their performance drops to a level close to
that of patients with Alzheimer’s disease when the perspective on
the pictures is changed (Graham, Simons, Pratt, Patterson, &
Hodges, 2000): The visual match seems essential in their recog-
nition performance. In a similar vein, Nadel et al. (2000) have
claimed that typical tests overestimate retrograde amnesia in se-
mantic dementia because of a reliance on verbal cuing to the
detriment of visual cuing of memories. They supported this claim
with observations from a patient with semantic dementia who, with
the help of visual cues, could be made to remember his wartime
memories of more than half a century earlier (Nadel et al., 2000;
see also Moss, Kopelman, Cappelletti, de Mornay Davies, &
Jaldow, 2003; Westmacott, Leach, Freedman, & Moscovitch,
2001). Whether or not the reverse gradient is a real pattern would
thus seem to depend on whether it can also be found with visual
cues. Such research has yet to take place on a large scale.
With regard to studies with experimental animals, the situation
is clearer. Animal studies do not suffer from a number of the
drawbacks of the human studies; experimenters have full control
over lesion size and can precisely control how long before surgery
they train animals on a task. Nevertheless, it is only in the past 20
years that animal work has started to weigh in on the retrograde
amnesia discussion. Of approximately 15 pertinent studies per-
formed during that period, a clear majority have revealed Ribot
gradients (Murray & Bussey, 2001; Nadel & Bohbot, 2001; Squire,
Clark, & Knowlton, 2001). Some have not, and it is not yet clear
what explains these conflicting results. Murray and Bussey (2001)
listed a number of factors that may play a role, such as the use of
within-subject versus between-subjects designs (with the former
yielding more Ribot gradients but being more open to alternative
explanations) and type of lesion (with more limited lesions favor-
ing a Ribot gradient). However, studies involving between-
subjects designs and complete lesions of the hippocampus have
also demonstrated Ribot gradients (Clark, Broadbent, Zola, &
Squire, 2002; Winocur et al., 2001).
In summary, remote memory gradients in semantic dementia
will need more research for firm conclusions. In human and animal
studies of retrograde amnesia, however, the onus seems to be
squarely on those who want to disqualify the Ribot gradient,
although methodological confounds cannot be wholly excluded.
Empirical Challenges to the Ribot Gradient
Two recent findings have muddied the water, however, in both
the human and animal retrograde amnesia literatures. On the
human side, a study appeared of three patients who had grown up
with extensive hippocampal damage incurred during childhood
(Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Although all three had quite strong
amnesia, as assessed by standard episodic memory tests, they had
done reasonably well in normal schools and had gained a substan-
tial basis of general knowledge. These findings have led some to
suggest that there are two ways of acquiring general knowledge:
rapid, hippocampus-dependent learning and slow, neocortical
learning (Holdstock, Mayes, Isaac, Gong, & Roberts, 2002). This
is not inconsistent with consolidation theory, as consolidation
theorists have already assumed slow, implicit learning in the
neocortex (Meeter & Murre, in press). Others have argued against
two ways of learning, suggesting that residual episodic memory is
in all three cases enough to explain acquired knowledge (Squire &
Zola, 1998). Whether or not this is the case, the patients described
by Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) do not seem to present a serious
challenge to consolidation theory.
In the animal literature, the reemergence of “reconsolidation”
has complicated the picture. Electroshocks to the brain have a
greater effect on recent memories than on remote ones, producing
graded amnesia after electroconvulsive therapy (Squire, Slater, &
Chace, 1975). It has long been known that older memories, nor-
mally immune to electroshocks, can become vulnerable again
when they are retrieved just before the shocks (Misanin, Miller, &
Lewis, 1968). Somehow, reactivation makes a memory susceptible
to amnesic treatments; it has to be “reconsolidated” to reenter in an
invulnerable state.
The destabilizing effect of retrieval has been tied to the amyg-
dala (Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000) and, recently, to the hip-
pocampus. Debiec et al. (2002) elicited contextual fear in rats by
administering shocks in a distinct context. The test occurred 4 days
later. On the day before the test, some rats were exposed to the
context as a reminder and subsequently infused with the protein
synthesis blocker. This produced a large drop in contextual fear;
without a reminder, the protein synthesis blocker had no effect on
performance. The reminder thus brought the fear memory into a
vulnerable state in which protein synthesis was necessary to main-
tain the memory. Protein synthesis was necessary in the hippocam-
pus, even after a 45-day interval that normally makes contextual
fear memories independent of the hippocampus.
Reminder treatments can also make remote memories that nor-
mally survive hippocampal lesions vulnerable to hippocampal
damage (Debiec et al., 2002; Land, Bunsey, & Riccio, 2000). Land
et al. (2000) trained rats to escape a footshock by moving to a
lighted part of a Y-shaped apparatus (a signaled avoidance task).
When rats were given a hippocampal lesion 30 days after training,
performance on this task remained relatively intact, as it did in
other studies (Kim & Fanselow, 1992). If a reminder of the context
preceded the operation, however, hippocampal lesions after 30
days erased the fear memory. Memories thus remain vulnerable
after reactivation long after they have ceased to be exclusively
dependent on the hippocampus. Nevertheless, it is not the case that
reconsolidation is entirely symmetric to acquisition. For example,
the period of vulnerability of a memory is much shorter after
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reconsolidation than after acquisition (Debiec et al., 2002; Nader,
2003).
The resulting picture is one that is difficult but not impossible to
reconcile with consolidation theory. Memories are initially depen-
dent on the hippocampus, become independent of it through con-
solidation, and then are returned to a hippocampus-dependent state
through retrieval. If consolidated memories are stored in the neo-
cortical traces, as suggested by models of consolidation (Alvarez
& Squire, 1994; Meeter & Murre, 2004, in press), it is hard to see
why this would be the case. Does retrieval of a consolidated
memory destroy its neocortical base, requiring renewed consoli-
dation to repair it? Are all memories destroyed and repaired after
their retrieval? At present, this remains speculation, speculation
that is, moreover, elicited by only a single study. A similar study
investigating reconsolidation with inhibitory avoidance learning
resulted in a more traditional Ribot curve of vulnerability: Fear
memories were sensitive to protein synthesis inhibitors after a
reminder only when reminder and injection took place within 14
days after learning (Milekic & Alberini, 2002). More studies are
clearly needed to investigate the precise characteristics of recon-
solidation. Thus, although its relevance for long-term memory
consolidation is obvious, it is too early to know what lessons to
take from it.
Alternatives
Although there are thus neuropsychological, functional imaging,
and neuropharmacological studies (especially Bontempi et al.,
1999; Izquierdo et al., 1997) that support consolidation theory, the
main reason to suggest such a process remains the existence of the
Ribot gradient in retrograde amnesia. Other explanations have also
been offered for this gradient, however. The two most plausible
candidates are the multiple trace theory of Nadel and Moscovitch
(1997) and the semantization hypothesis.
Moscovitch and Nadel’s Multiple Trace Model
From 1997 on, Nadel, Moscovitch, and colleagues (Moscovitch
& Nadel, 1999; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Nadel et al., 2000)
have engaged in a concerted and coherent assault on consolidation
theory. Most of their arguments against consolidation have already
been mentioned, but they also have presented a competing view:
multiple trace theory. Its central tenet is that the hippocampal
complex, comprising the hippocampal formation and surrounding
medial–temporal lobe neocortex, remains involved in the retrieval
of all remote memories. Extensive medial–temporal lobe damage
should therefore cause a flat retrograde amnesia with near com-
plete loss of both recent and remote memories. Ribot gradients are,
according to Nadel and Moscovitch (1997), found only with partial
lesions of the hippocampal complex. To explain this, they hypoth-
esize that memories in the hippocampus are replicated over time.
Because remote memories have more copies in the hippocampus,
they can survive greater levels of hippocampal damage. This idea
forms the basis of simulation work with an analytical model as
well as a connectionist one (Nadel et al., 2000). Both are only
models of retrograde amnesia; multiple trace theory does not aim
to explain anterograde amnesia or the relationship between antero-
grade and retrograde amnesia.
The computational implementations of the theory are not very
convincing. In fact, the connectionist model is not wholly consis-
tent with the theory. Moscovitch and Nadel (1999) stated that “the
reactivated traces have minimal neural overlap in the medial
temporal lobe, but extensive overlap in neocortex” (p. 89). In their
description of the connectionist network, however, they remarked
that “multiple replicated traces ascribed to one and the same
memory highly overlap . . . and therefore produce a collective
attractor, which may not coincide with any of the replicas” (Sam-
sonovitch, Nadel, & Moscovitch, 1999, p. 7). This contradicts the
minimal overlap that reactivated traces were said to have in the
medial–temporal lobe and indeed must have for the theory to
explain the Ribot gradient (if replicas of memories were strongly
correlated, there would be no reason why larger lesions would
spare memories with many replicas more often than memories
with few replicas).
In the analytical model, Nadel et al. (2000) encountered a
serious problem: Memories that were replicated often became so
numerous that they dominated the entire memory store. This is a
version of runaway consolidation encountered in simulations of
consolidation (Meeter, 2003); memories that are consolidated have
a higher likelihood of being consolidated anew and end up mo-
nopolizing consolidation resources. To deflect this problem, Nadel
et al. (2000) proposed versions with either a limit to the number of
copies any memory can collect or a limit on the time that a
memory can be copied. Both changes seem a little ad hoc (Do
memories come with tags specifying the amount of replication
needed?), and neither change produces forgetting and Ribot curves
that are particularly convincing (in both model variants, the oldest
memories are best remembered, producing U-shaped forgetting
curves).
If we concentrate on the verbal theory, it is not evident why
multiple trace theory does not suffer from exactly the same flaws
as consolidation theory. For example, the underlying process of
trace replication is as unclear as that of consolidation. Does trace
replication occur only with explicit rehearsal of memories? Is there
an automatic process, operating perhaps during sleep, behind trace
replication? Multiple trace theory also shares the greatest weak-
ness of consolidation theory. Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) argued
that the timing of consolidation is unconvincing: Why should such
processes take 25 years, the duration of a medieval person’s life?
But why should trace replication take 25 years? Nadel et al. (2000)
did propose a version in which the time that memories participate
in trace replication is limited. In this version the Ribot gradient did
not stretch very far, however, presumably only as far as trace
replication occurred (see their Figure 2c).
We could imagine a variant of multiple trace theory that would
not assume trace replication but instead a trace strengthening at
each retrieval attempt, perhaps accompanied by a binding to a new
context. The connectionist network could be seen as an implemen-
tation of such a process, and it could plausibly be equated with
reconsolidation (reconsolidation would make no sense in the con-
text of trace replication, as the creation of new copies of a memory
should leave old copies alone). Although this equation would have
the benefit of tying the theory to neurobiology, it would also force
a reappraisal of what exactly the hippocampal complex of multiple
trace theory is. In the studies of reconsolidation discussed earlier,
it was the dorsal hippocampus in which protein synthesis was
blocked (Debiec et al., 2002). If trace strengthening were to be
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equated to reconsolidation, then multiple trace theory’s hippocam-
pal complex would have to be equated to the hippocampus and
perhaps its immediate surroundings. This would make findings of
graded retrograde amnesia after complete hippocampal lesions
(Clark et al., 2002; Winocur et al., 2001) very problematic for the
theory.
Although multiple trace theory thus has its flaws as an expla-
nation of the Ribot gradient, there are undoubtedly data that it can
explain better than consolidation theory. Most obviously, it can
deal very well with patient data indicating a flat gradient in
retrograde amnesia (e.g., Cipolotti et al., 2001) or an involvement
of the hippocampus in the retrieval of remote episodic memories in
functional brain imaging studies (Maguire et al., 2001; Ryan et al.,
2001). Given the assumption that uncopied memories are lost from
the hippocampus, it also deals well with the putative hippocampal
NMDA receptor involvement in memory consolidation (Shimizu
et al., 2000). However, data indicating a limited involvement of the
hippocampus in retrieval of remote memories (Bontempi et al.,
1999; Frankland et al., 2001; Haist et al., 2001; Niki & Luo, 2002)
are problematic for multiple trace theory. Studies in which hip-
pocampal deactivation is not complete, however, pose no chal-
lenge to the theory (Izquierdo et al., 1997). Moreover, if in se-
mantic dementia patients there is a reverse gradient in retrograde
amnesia and faster forgetting than in normal individuals, multiple
trace theory would not be able to deal very well with that (Graham,
1999).
Semantization
As suggested in a previous section, some gradients in retrograde
amnesia are open to the alternative explanation that the tested
remote memories are qualitatively different from the tested recent
memories. One such difference might be that the remote memories
are semantic, whereas recent memories are episodic (Cermak,
1984). Episodic memories are generally seen as those bound to a
spatial and temporal context (i.e., memories of events), whereas
semantic memories are ones that contain our general knowledge of
the world (Tulving, 1972, 1983). If semantic memory were spared
in amnesia and episodic memory not spared, this would lead to an
apparent loss of recent (episodic) memories with sparing of remote
(semantic) memories.
In support of this explanation, it was noted that autobiographical
incidents recalled by amnesic patients often come over more as
semantic, inflexible stories than as episodic memories (Kinsbourne
& Wood, 1975); they thus resemble general knowledge more than
they do vivid memories of past events. However, several studies
have shown that semantic memory is implicated in amnesia
(Squire & Zola, 1998). There is, for example, little evidence that
new learning of semantic memories can take place in the presence
of dense episodic amnesia (Verfaellie, Koseff, & Alexander,
2000), whereas retrograde amnesia has been found even for the
hallmark of semantic memory, lexical knowledge (Verfaellie, Re-
iss, & Roth, 1995). A sparing of semantic knowledge is thus
probably untenable as an explanation for the Ribot gradient, at
least if memories are thought of as rigidly divided into episodic
and semantic memories.
Nevertheless, one might construct a theory of progressive “se-
mantization” of memories with age to explain the Ribot gradient.
In such a view, all memories start out as episodic, but with time
some become semantic. This process can be thought of as one of
decontextualization: Episodic memories are bound to a spatial and
temporal context, and loss of this context information makes the
memories semantic. Such a process is not far-fetched; in fact, it is
a plausible theory of how semantic memories are formed
(Schooler, Shiffrin, & Raaijmakers, 2001). The Ribot gradient can
now be explained as the loss of recent, still episodic memories and
the sparing of remote, semanticized memories. A hint of this
“semantization” view of retrograde amnesia was already apparent
in Cermak’s (1984) report in which he described spared remote
autobiographical memories as being part of “personal folklore.”
This theory was recently worked out in detail by Rosenbaum,
Winocur, and Moscovitch (2001), though they framed their ver-
sion in terms of different kinds of contexts.
Why would a lesion to the hippocampal system affect episodic
memories more than semantic memories? There are two possibil-
ities. First, episodic memories may be stored in the hippocampal
system and semantic memories in the neocortex. This raises the
question of how memories, in the process of semantization, are
transported from the hippocampal system to the neocortex. What-
ever the proposed mechanism, it will be difficult to distinguish
from consolidation theory. Second, both kinds of memories may
be stored in the neocortex, with only episodic memories needing
the hippocampus for their retrieval. This is the possibility that
Rosenbaum et al. (2001) seemed to have in mind, but it is not
unproblematic. It raises the question of why memories need time
to “semanticize,” why semantic memories are not immediately
spared by hippocampal lesions. According to Rosenbaum et al.
(2001), memories may need to be repeated many times to build up
representations strong enough to be retrieved without the help of
the hippocampal system. If this were all, then semantization would
come down to the idea that old memories survive hippocampal
damage because they are overlearned and, through that overlearn-
ing, stored in the neocortex in a sufficiently strong, decontextual-
ized way. This would be reminiscent of the “slow” and “fast”
learning of semantic knowledge assumed by Holdstock et al.
(2002) to explain findings from patients with childhood hippocam-
pal lesions (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997).
Most experiments showing Ribot gradients in experimental an-
imals, however, have involved one-trial learning. Here overlearn-
ing cannot be the explanation for the Ribot gradient. Rosenbaum et
al. (2001) did discuss such studies. Of one experiment involving
socially acquired food preference, they stated that “with passage of
time, the link between food preference and the relational context
becomes less important than the memory for the preference itself”
(Rosenbaum et al., 2001, p. 191). This gives the impression that
episodic memories somehow fall apart, and what is left over is a
semantic memory consisting of simple associations. Such an idea
is consistent with findings from the animal conditioning literature,
in which a loss of the context dependency of performance has been
explained by assuming that animals forget contextual elements
before forgetting more simple associations (Bouton, Nelson, &
Rosas, 1999). However, links with context were purportedly stored
in the hippocampal system. It is difficult to see how hippocampal
forgetting might make neocortical semantic memories stronger.
It would seem, thus, that overlearning is the only tenable inter-
pretation for the process of semantization. The idea that the neo-
cortex stores simple associations that can be built up by multiple
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repetitions is generally accepted (and is accepted by consolidation
theorists; McClelland et al., 1995; Meeter & Murre, in press;
Murre, 1997). Indeed, because consolidation theory also proposes
that memories are stored in the neocortex via multiple learning
trials, it would seem that semantization and consolidation are
indistinguishable concepts. Two features separate them, though.
Semantization has been presented as occurring because of explicit
repetition and relearning (Rosenbaum et al., 2001), whereas con-
solidation is often thought of as an automatic process, perhaps
occurring during sleep. Moreover, the semantization explanation is
motivated by the idea that there are qualitative differences between
memories retained and lost in amnesia (the latter are episodic in
nature, the former not). Although consolidation theorists have
generally not stated that a consolidated, neocortical memory is
qualitatively indistinguishable from its forebearer that was bound
together by the hippocampal system, they have certainly invited
the suspicion that they think in such ways (i.e., by defending that
remote, consolidated spatial memories of a patient with amnesia
were indistinguishable from normal spatial memories; Teng &
Squire, 1999).
Semantization is consistent with the episodic memory deficits
seen in semantic dementia. If remote “episodic” memories are in
fact semantic, the central tenet of semantization, then it is logical
that those memories are lost when semantic memory is degraded.
Studies showing a flat gradient in retrograde amnesia (Cipolotti et
al., 2001) are also compatible with semantization if one assumes
that they involved tests restricted to episodic memories. Some of
the data indicating limited involvement of the hippocampus in
retrieval of remote memories can be explained by assuming that
episodic memories stored in the hippocampus are forgotten,
whereas semantic memories stored in the neocortex are over-
learned. This would lead to a shift, with time, of the brunt of
retrieval from the hippocampus to the neocortex (Bontempi et al.,
1999; Frankland et al., 2001; Haist et al., 2001; Niki & Luo, 2002).
The danger with such explanations is, of course, that “semantic”
and “episodic” become synonymous with “relying on the hip-
pocampus” and “relying on the neocortex,” which would make the
theory unfalsifiable (episodic–semantic is one of those distinctions
that become very fluid once one looks too closely; McKoon,
Ratcliff, & Dell, 1986). Strict operationalization of “episodic” and
“semantic” (or the two kinds of contexts that Rosenbaum et al.,
2001, described and viewed as equivalent to the two kinds of
memory) would be needed for semantization to be a useful theory
of retrograde amnesia.
Despite its helpful vagueness, semantization cannot be recon-
ciled with all studies. Animal studies showing graded retrograde
amnesia after one-trial learning (e.g., Anagnostaras et al., 2001;
Kim & Fanselow, 1992) must be rejected if semantization is the
real explanation for the Ribot gradient. So must the study of
Izquierdo et al. (1997), which pointed to a strengthening of cortical
memories in the absence of overlearning. The findings of Debiec
et al. (2002) concerning reconsolidation are also not intelligible if
hippocampal and neocortical memories are seen as essentially
independent. Moreover, retrograde amnesia for lexical knowledge
(Verfaellie et al., 1995) remains a rather challenging finding for
the theory: Would it be plausible to assume that even lexical
knowledge starts its life as episodic memories?
Conclusion
Memory consolidation has often been invoked to explain the
Ribot gradient in retrograde amnesia, the finding that after damage
to the medial–temporal lobe, recent memories are affected more
than remote memories. Despite more than a century of theorizing,
the exact nature of such memory consolidation is still unclear.
Computational models of consolidation have shed a little light on
how it may be viewed, however. They have implemented consol-
idation as an automatic process in which neocortical memories are
retrieved from a random cue through strong links to the hippocam-
pus. Subsequently, connections within the hippocampal pattern are
strengthened. From this implementation, several constraints on
consolidation can be derived: There is a period in which memories
are reactivated concurrently in the hippocampus and the neocortex.
Then learning must take place in the neocortex, while plasticity in
the hippocampus is low. Improvements in memory performance
can be expected to follow from consolidation.
Consolidation is often thought to occur during sleep, and there
is evidence that the just-mentioned conditions pertain during slow-
wave sleep. Memories seem to be reactivated in both the hip-
pocampus and the neocortex, neocortical reorganization takes
place, plasticity is low in the hippocampus, and memory seems to
improve somewhat through deep sleep. Two elements are still
missing for this evidence to be conclusive. One is that during
reactivation of memories in sleep, learning should be demonstrated
in the neocortical sites where reactivations take place. The second
element is that, whereas all evidence linking slow-wave sleep to
memory was gathered in the first sleep episode after learning new
material, consolidation must take place over much longer periods
to be a viable explanation for the Ribot gradient. It is thus still
speculative whether consolidation takes place during sleep. Even if
it does, sleep would not necessarily be the only phase in which
memory consolidation occurs.
Much of the appeal of consolidation theory has, for a long
time, been that no other explanation for data from retrograde
amnesia was satisfactory. The Ribot curve might be a method-
ological artifact. Although this possibility cannot be excluded,
there is so far also no compelling evidence that it is the case.
Two alternative explanations for the evidence are available. The
central tenet of multiple trace theory is that the hippocampal
memory system is crucial for the storage and retrieval of all
episodic memories, independently of the age of the memory.
Graded retrograde amnesia results, according to this theory,
from partial damage to the hippocampus, which preferentially
spares old memories that have been replicated often. Another
explanation, here labeled semantization, assumes that all mem-
ories start out as episodic but that some become semantic
through overlearning. After damage to the substrate of episodic
memory (the hippocampus), these “semanticized” memories are
spared, which explains the Ribot gradient.
All three theories—consolidation, multiple trace, and semanti-
zation—are to some extent speculative, and to many their differ-
ences may seem empirically intractable. Indeed, some studies
offered here as evidence for consolidation have elsewhere been
interpreted as evidence against it. Nevertheless, several empirical
predictions differentiate the theories, and each deals better or
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worse with some of the empirical data gathered so far (see Table
1 for a summary). In a strict sense, all three theories have already
been falsified and can only be saved by either ad hoc additions or
rejection of certain data. The most important inconsistencies are
the following.
1. If the hippocampus is necessary for retrieval of memories
independently of their age (as some fMRI studies indicate
and can be derived from flat gradient studies), then
consolidation theory must be rejected.
2. If total lesion or deactivation of the hippocampus leads to
graded memory loss (e.g., Winocur et al., 2001), multiple
trace theory is rejected. So it is when the hippocampus is
less involved in the retrieval of remote episodic memo-
ries than of recent episodic memories (e.g., Bontempi et
al., 1999).
3. If one-trial learning can lead to graded retrograde amne-
sia (e.g., Izquierdo et al., 1997), then semantization is
rejected as an explanation for the Ribot gradient. The
same is true when it can be established that there is no
qualitative difference between memories retrained in
graded retrograde amnesia and normal remote memories
(e.g., as suggested by Teng & Squire, 1999).
More testable differences would probably come to light if the
vagueness of all three theories were eliminated. Vaguest is perhaps
semantization. The distinction between episodic and semantic
memory is not always very clear (McKoon et al., 1986), but this
vagueness is amplified substantially if individual memories
change, during their lifetime, from episodic to semantic: One
needs to assume an ill-defined process that transforms a memory
from one ill-defined state to another. One way in which the
distinction can again be sharpened is by specifying the role of
context in storage and retrieval of both types of memory (Schooler
et al., 2001). A first attempt in that direction has been made by
Rosenbaum et al. (2001), with their distinction between associative
and relational contexts.
Although the central mechanism of multiple trace theory is
much clearer, the theory would be helped by a compelling com-
putational implementation that shows the feasibility of its expla-
nation of the Ribot gradient. Such an implementation would, it is
hoped, also bring to the fore the consequences of the theory for
memory function. Multiple trace theory, as well as consolidation
theory, suffers from a lack of clarity about the process behind its
central mechanism. Do consolidation and trace multiplication oc-
cur only during explicit retrieval of memories? Are they automatic
processes occurring during sleep? Is reconsolidation the process
behind multiple trace theory? Current vagueness allows even for a
mushy compromise in which most consolidation occurs during
conscious retrieval and consolidated memories are a little more
semantic than unconsolidated ones. Some formulation according to
these lines would probably be acceptable to proponents of all three
theories, but that does not make it automatically correct.
An aspect on which all three theories are equally vague is the
time course of the processes involved. Within consolidation the-
ory, the results of Izquierdo et al. (1997) suggest a possible
solution to this time problem. They imply that consolidation is
perhaps best seen as a cascade wherein memories travel through
several temporary depositories, with each depository functioning
as the “link” for the next until a final region representation is
established in the neocortex (e.g., from the hippocampus to the
entorhinal cortex to the neocortex). The more stages destroyed, the
longer the Ribot gradient may be.
Whether or not such a rephrasing of consolidation theory im-
proves its ability to account for gradients, it is hoped that more
research will soon enable the scientific community to choose
among the three theories. Moreover, the moment at which consol-
idation during sleep can be proved or rejected seems near, and not
Table 1
Findings Discussed in This Article, Along With Explanations That the Three Discussed Theories Would Offer for Them
Finding Consolidation Multiple trace theory Semantization
Graded RA after hipp. damage Recent mem.: hipp.; remote mem.:
neocortex
Partial hipp. damage Recent mem.: episodic; remote
mem.: semantic
Ungraded RA after hipp. damage  Total hipp. damage Only episodic memory tested
Semantic RA (Verfaellie et al.,
1995)
  
Semantic dementia Reverse gradient, faster forgetting No reverse gradient, no faster
forgetting
Semantic: reverse gradient and
faster forgetting; episodic:
no gradient and normal
forgetting
fMRI: more hipp. activity for recent
mem. than remote
  Remote memories semantic
fMRI: hipp. activity same for
remote and recent
Hipp. activation during remote
memory search unessential
 All memories episodic
Izquierdo et al. (1997)  Hipp. deactivation not complete 
Riedel et al. (1999)  Loss of all memories Loss of all memories
Frankland et al. (2001)   
Shimizu et al. (2000) NMDA important for transmission Information lost without trace
copying

Note. RA  retrograde amnesia; hipp.  hippocampal; mem.  memories;   unproblematic;   inconsistent with the theory without ad hoc
assumptions; fMRI  functional magnetic resonance imaging; NMDA  N-methyl-D-aspartate.
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too early: One century of hypothetical memory consolidation is
enough.
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